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STATECRAFT: DESIGNING FOREIGN POLICY 
DIPLOMACY 6181 
SPRING 2018 
Professor: Ann Marie Murphy 
E-mail: Annmarie.murphy@shu.edu 
Tel: 973-275-2258 
Office: 1 3 5  McQuaid Hall 
Office Hours: Tues. 4-5 and by 
appointment 
COURSE DESCRIPTION 
This course will introduce students to the study of statecraft: the design of strategies to 
achieve foreign policy goals; the choice of policy instruments within these strategies; and 
an assessment of their relative utility in achieving national objectives. This class begins 
by exploring key theoretical underpinnings of statecraft such as bargaining, power, 
threats, promises and cost/benefit analysis. It then examines different tools of statecraft, 
including strategic bombing, economic sanctions, foreign aid and trade, targeted killings, 
and propaganda. The course analyzes the objectives typically associated with each policy 
tool, the conditions under which they are most likely to be effective in accomplishing 
these goals, and debates regarding the proper way to measure effectiveness. Using the 
conceptual tools studied in class, all students will craft a foreign affairs strategy on a 
topic of their choice. 
REQUIRMENTS 
All students are expected to come to class having read the assigned material and prepared 
to discuss it in an authoritative manner. Class participation is an important component of 
this class, and will account for 10% of each student's grade. In addition, there will be a 
take home midterm that will be handed out on February 27 and due on March 1 3 .  The 
midterm will count for 35% of the class grade. Students will also write a 20 page 
strategy paper and present their conclusions to the class. For this paper, students will 
choose a foreign policy case, frame the policy in terms of the analytical tools studied in 
class. The paper and presentation will account for 45% and 10% respectively. 
Presentations will be made at the end of the semester and papers are due on May 8, the 
last day of class. 
This course is roughly divided into two sections. The first half of the class is devoted to 
studying the foundations and tools of statecraft. The second half of class following 
spring break is devoted to constructing the policy paper. Particularly during this part of 
the course, you will need to simultaneously ( 1 )  read the assigned text, (2) conduct 
research on foreign (and domestic) policy of your chosen case, and (3) gradually design a 
viable cost-effective strategy. In order to accomplish the task of designing a strategy we 
will devote the first part of each class to analyzing the assigned texts. The second part of 
the class will be devoted to applying the material discussed in that class to your concrete 
case. Thus, you will not only have to closely read the assigned texts before each class but 
you will also have to know whether a specific goal is desirable/viable and whether a 
specific foreign policy tool is available and useful for achieving your country's specific 
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goal(s). I will assess your progress weekly because each week at least 30% of students 
will discuss their work, accomplishments as well as challenges. 
Case studies must be chosen in consultation with the instructor, so it behooves all of you 
to begin thinking about the country you want to research as soon as possible. The paper 
must include a wide variety of primary and secondary sources and include proper citation 
of sources and a complete bibliography. The structure of the foreign affairs strategy laid 
out in the Deibel volume will serve as a basis for the paper, which must include the 
following: 
Two major foreign policy objectives; 
The international strategic environment as it relates to your country's objectives; 
The regional strategic environment as it relates to your country's objectives; 
The domestic context for strategy; 
Foreign policy instruments to be used; 
Possible restraints; 
Linking ends and means. 
In addition to the assigned materials, students should keep abreast of major foreign policy 
issues by reading the New York Times and magazines such as The Economist on a regular 
basis. The instructor will reference current policy issues to illustrate analytical readings 
throughout the semester, and it is imperative that students be up to date. 
Academic Integrity 
Plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty will be reported to the administration, and 
will result in a lowered or failing grade for the course and may lead to dismissal from the School 
of Diplomacy. See university and school standards for academic conduct here: 
htlp://www.shu.edu/o ffices/stuclent-1 i fe/com mun i  ty-standards/communi ty-standards.cfm 
http://www. hu.edu/academics/dipl 
Students with Disabilities 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Civi l  Rights Restoration Act, 
students at Seton Hall University who have a disabil ity may be el igib le for accommodations in 
this course. Should a student require such accommodation, he or she must self-identify at the 
Office of Disability Support Services (DSS), Room 67, Duffy Hall, provide documentation of 
said disability, and work with DSS to develop a plan for accommodations. The contact person is 
Ms. Diane Delorenzo at (973) 3 13 -6003 .  
JANUARY 23 CLASS 1 INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS STATECRAFT 
AND HOW WILL IT BE STUDIED IN THIS COURSE? 
2 
David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 
3-28. 
Key Questions: What is statecraft and why should we study it? What are the four key 
types of statecraft discussed by Baldwin? What is power, and why is it so central to the 
study of foreign policy? What is the distinction between power resources and influence? 
JANUARY 30 CLASS 2 FOUNDATIONS OF STATECRAFT: POLICY 
ENGINEERING, THREATS AND PROMISES 
Philip Zeilkow, "Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again" 
International Security, Vol. 18 ,  No. 4 (Spring, 1994) pp. 1 4 3 - 1 7 1 .  Focus on his 7 
components of foreign policy-making, which begins on p. 155 .  
David A. Baldwin, "Thinking About Threats" and "The Power of Positive Sanctions" in 
Paradoxes of Power (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989) pp. 45-57, and 58-8 1 .  
Alexander George, The Limits a/Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, Westview Press,), pp. 7- 
21 
Key Questions: Under what conditions are threats/promises more costly? Are positive 
or negative sanctions necessarily more effective than the other? What type of 
information would Baldwin contend a policy-maker needs to know in order before 
choosing how to attempt to exert influence in a given situation? Do we need different 
conceptual frameworks to analyze military and economic statecraft? What three types of 
knowledge does Zeilkow contend good policy-making requires? What are the seven 
components of his policy policy-making process? What is coercive diplomacy? Is it 
synonymous with military statecraft? Can promises be a component of coercive 
strategy? 
Case: Iranian Nuclear Chess: After the Deal, Robert Litwak, available at: 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/irans-nuclear-chess-after-the-deal 
Note: this is a long, 130 page report, albeit with lots of charts, footnotes etc. Read the 
following, although the entire report is very useful. Executive Summary p. 7- 1 1  and the 
Introduction p. 1 3 - 19 .  Please note that we will return repeatedly to this case, so if your 
workload is fairly light now at the beginning of the semester, READ ahead! 
As you read the case, apply the readings to it. Zeilkow makes a distinction between 
policy objectives and policy preferences-identify them in this case. What tools of 
statecraft were used to achieve the nuclear deal? Identify the threats and promises used 
in this case to arrive at the deal from both the U.S . and Iranian perspective. 
FEBRUARY 6 CLASS 3 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT I: THE 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DEBATE 
3 
Required: 
Stefanie Ann Lenway, "Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as a Tool of 
Statecraft," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 2, (Spring 1988) pp. 397-426. NO 
need to read the Megarian Case. 
Risa A. Brooks, "Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?" Security 
Studies 1 1 ,  No 4, (Summer 2002) p. 1-50.  
Ame Tostensen, Beate Bull, "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible? World Politics, Vol 54, No. 
3, April 2002, pp. 373-403. 
John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "The Sanctions of Mass Destruction?" Foreign Affairs, 
May/June 1999. pp. 43-53. 
Emma Ashford, "Not so Smart Sanctions" Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2016 .  
NYT on North Korea Sanctions TBA 
Key Questions: What is the precise logic of the process by which sanctions are designed 
to achieve the goals of the sender country? How do HSE define and measure state goals 
and the success of sanctions episodes? Lenway compares and contrasts the frameworks 
employed by HSE and Baldwin, particularly the criteria used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of sanctions. Which one do you find more compelling for policy-makers? Brooks calls 
for a more nuanced approach to sanctions, focusing on targeted sanctions designed to 
impose costs on politically influential groups. How does a country's regime type affect 
the likelihood that different types of sanctions will be effective? What are smart 
sanctions? What are some of the difficulties of implementing smart sanctions? What 
costs do sanctions impose on the sending country? Does Emma Ashford believe that the 
sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine are smart? Do you agree with 
her assessment of a) how to frame the goals of the countries imposing sanctions and b) 
their effectiveness? There is a tendency in the literature to view economic sanctions as a 
more "humane" tool of statecraft than military force. Do Mueller and Mueller agree? 
Recommended: 
David, A Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," International 
Security, 24, No. 3, (winter 1999/2000) pp. 80-107. 
Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work" International Security 22, No 
2 (Fall 1997) pp. 90-136 .  
Kimberly Ann Elliot, "The Sanctions Galss: Half Full or Completely Empty? 
International Security, Vol. 23 ,  No. 1 (Summer 1998) pp. 50-65. 
Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work, International Security 22, 
No 2 (Fall 1997) pp. 90-136. 
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FEBRUARY 13 CLASS 4 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT II: FOREIGN AID, 
TRADE, INVESTMENT AND FINANCE 
David A. Baldwin, "Foreign Trade" and "Foreign Aid" in Economic Statecraft 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 206-222. and pp. 290-310.  NOTE 
THAT YOU ARE ONLY ASSIGNED PARTS OF BALDWIN'S CHAPTERS ON 
TRADE AND AID 
Arthur A. Goldsmith, "Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa" International Organization, 
Vol. 55,  No. 1 ,  Winter 2001, p. 123-144.  NOTE THAT YOU CAN SKIP THE 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND FOCUS ON HIS QUESTIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS. 
Michael Froman, The Strategic Logic of Trade: New Rules of the Road for the Global 
Market," Foreign Affairs, 93, 6, Nov-Dec, 2014 .  The USTR making a case for the TPP. 
Richard Katz, "Mutually Assured Production: Why Trade Will Limit Conflict Between 
China and Japan" Foreign Affairs, 2013 .  
Mark Strauss, "How China's Rare Earth Weapon Went from Boom to Bust" 
NYT Articles on Russia and Gazprom' s cut-off of natural gas to Ukraine. 
"Rogue to Vogue? Despite its Reputation, Chinese Aid is Quite Effective" The 
Economist 
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21730195-new-study-reassesses-notion-china­ 
bad-donor-despite-its-reputation-chinese-aid 
Article on North Korea Sanctions TBA 
Recommended: 
Adam Segal, "Chinese Computer Games: Keeping Safe in Cyberspace" Foreign Affairs, 
9 1 ,  2, April, May 2012.  
Key Questions: What are supply and influence effects of international trade and the 
logic by which they exert influence? What are strategic goods? How should one 
conceptualize the role of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy? How should the 
effectiveness of foreign aid be measured? Conditionality in foreign aid is a controversial 
topic. What are the arguments made by each side in this debate, and which ones do you 
find more persuasive? What is the "aid perversity" thesis according to Goldmith? Does 
he find evidence to support this? China and Japan have longstanding historical 
animosities and in recent years tensions over territorial conflicts over the East China Sea 
have risen. Why does Katz claim that trade will limit conflict between China and Japan? 
How, if at all, does China's threat to cut off rare earth metals to Japan make you reassess 
Katz's argument? Was China's use of its rare earth monopoly successful? Does Russia 
5 
have an oil and gas weapon, and how should one measure the cost of using it, and assess 
its relative success? Froman, former USTR makes an argument about why the TPP was 
in the US strategic interest. Do you agree? 
FEB. 20 CLASS 5 
BOMBING 
Robert Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Chapters 1 and 2, 
pp. 12-86, and the 1991 Iraq case, pp. 2 1 1  to 254. 
Karl P. Mueller, Jefrey Martini, and Thomas Hamilton, "Airpower Options for Syria" 
Rand Corporation, 2013 .  
Angela Stent, "Putin's Power Play in Syria" Foreign Affairs, 2016 .  
Recommended: 
Aaron Belkin et all, "When is Strategic bombing Effective? Domestic Legitimacy and 
Aerial Denial. Security Studies, 1 1 ,  no 4 (Summer 2002) p. 5 1 -88 .  
Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of 
Warfare" International Security, vol. 26, No. 2, (Fall 2000) pp. 5-44. 
A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo" International 
Security, Vol. 27, No 3, (Winter 2002/03), pp. 124-157.  
Key Questions: Pape argues that coercive airpower takes two different forms: 
punishment and denial. What is the difference in logic underlying these two strategies 
and which one does he contend is more effective? Why? What is the logic of 
decapitation? One of the key difficulty in evaluating the relative effectiveness of air 
power as an instrument of statecraft is isolating its influence from the threat of 
conventional war. How does Pape contend this can be done? What are the different 
policy objectives that the Rand study considers and how effectively do they contend 
airpower can achieve them? What are the U.S. objectives in Syria? How would it rank 
them and to what extent are they compatible or competing? What are Russia's policy 
objectives and how are they seeking to achieve them? Which Syrian and other regional 
actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia) are targets of the U.S .  and Russian influence attempts, and 
what they trying to influence them to do? 
FEB. 27 CLASS 6 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT IV: TARGETED 
KILLINGS & PROPAGANDA 
**Midterm handed out 
Ward Thomas, "Norms and Security: The Case oflntemational Assassination" 
International Security, vol. 25 , No. 1 (Summer 2000) pp. 1 05 - 1 3 3 .  
Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder on Targeted Killings, 2013 .  
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TOOLS OF STATECRAFT III: STRATEGIC 
Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (CA: Sage 
Publications, 1992), pp. 1 -35 ;  212-228. 
Russia Propaganda in Crimea: How does it Work? The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17 /crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda­ 
media. 
March 6 No Class Spring Break, students should work on midterm and gathering 
data for their policy papers 
MARCH 13 CLASS 7 
CONTEXT 
**Midterm Due 
STRATEGY: ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL 
Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapters 1 & 2, pp. 1-77. 
Key Questions: 
Discuss the overarching strategic vision of your case. What is its international context 
and how does that constrain or incentivize different strategic options? 
MARCH 20 CLASS 8 
CONTEXT 
* 1 page paper proposal due. 
STRATEGY: ASSESSING THE DOMESTIC 
Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic/or American Statecraft (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 3,  pp. 1-77. 
Key Questions: 
What are the key domestic factors influencing your strategy? 
MARCH 27 CLASS 9 STRATEGY: INTERESTS, THREATS, 
OPPORTUNTIES & POWER 
Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 4&5, pp. 123-206. 
Key Questions: What are your country's objectives? Be prepared to justify the 
objectives, list them in order of priority and justify the ordering. 
*Paper outline due 
APRIL3 
POWER 
CLASS 10 STRATEGIC PLANNING: INSTRUMENTS OF STATE 
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Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 6, pp. 207-280. 
Key Questions: what instruments of state power will you use to achieve your objectives? 
How will you use them? By what mechanisms are they designed to achieve your 
objectives? 
APRIL 10 CLASS 11 LINKING ENDS AND MEANS & EVALUATING 
STRATEGY 
Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapters 7&8, pp. 281-359 .  
Key Questions: by what precise linkages is your strategy supposed to achieve your 
desired objectives? How will your target (s) react? Can you environs scenarios in which 
your proposed actions have an alternative affect? Are there back up plans for such 
contingencies? 
APRIL 17 
APRIL24 
MAYl 
MAYS 
CLASS 12 STUDENT PRESENTATIONS 
CLASS 13 STUDENT PRESENTATIONS 
CLASS 14 STUDENT PRESENTATIONS 
CLASS 15 STUDENT PRESENTATIONS 
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